At the outbreak of World War II in Europe, the American army - including the aviation component - numbered approx. 190,000. people, including 3 infantry divisions, a cavalry division, a Hawaiian division, a Filipino division and the Panama Canal Garrison. Obviously, this was a very small number compared to the Japanese or German troops. However, in the course of World War II, this army grew more than 40 times[!] to approx. 8.3 million people in mid-1945. Of course, this leap in growth also entailed a leap in the size of the US Army Corps. For example, between the summer of 1941 and the summer of 1947, as many as 67,000 candidates completed officer courses at the Officer Candidate School for infantry. Of course, most senior officers (from colonel and above) had higher military education before the summer of 1941. If we tried to assess the American officer cadre in the period 1941-1945, one could indicate a relatively small number of cardinal errors committed on the battlefield (see: General John Lucas' actions at Anzio in 1944 or, at a lower level, the attack of the 2nd Battalion of the 1st Armored Regiment of Sidi bou Zid during the Battle of the Kasserine Pass in 1943), sparing his soldiers, rather skilfully using a significant material advantage (especially during the fighting in Normandy in 1944), but also the ability to react fairly quickly to unforeseen actions of the enemy (vide : German counteroffensive in the Ardennes of 1944/1945). At the same time, however, it cannot be ignored that often American officers acted in a conservative, low-risk manner, striving for a certain victory. The exceptions included, above all, General Patton.